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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This case requires us to predict whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would hold that Pennsylvania law allows a 
corporation to waive uninsured/underinsured motorist 
("UM") coverage for its employees under a company 
insurance policy. If we decide that it can, we must then 
address whether the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment on the ground that the corporation in 
this case did so waive. We answer both questions in the 
affirmative; hence we affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.1 
 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
The basic facts are simple. In the scope and course of his 
employment, Joseph DiBartolo was driving a vehicle owned 
and insured by his employer, Knight-Ridder Inc. ("KRI"), 
when he was injured in an accident. DiBartolo does not 
own a personal vehicle, and so his only auto insurance 
comes through KRI. The car that struck him was uninsured 
as defined by Pennsylvania law. 
 
Travelers Indemnity Co. ("Travelers"), KRI's insurer, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While we considered certifying the corporate waiver question to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court pursuant to its order, see No. 197 Judicial 
Admin. Dkt. No. 1 (Pa. Oct. 28, 1998), we concluded that the issue was 
neither sufficiently important nor sufficiently difficult to command the 
attention of that tribunal. 
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brought a declaratory action to determine whether Travelers 
is obliged to provide him with uninsured motorist benefits 
despite KRI's attempts to waive such coverage. The District 
Court first granted summary judgment for Travelers 
on the ground that workers' compensation was 
DiBartolo's exclusive remedy. We reversed, predicting that 
Pennsylvania would hold to the contrary, see Travelers 
Indemnity Co. v. DiBartolo, 131 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(DiBartolo I),2 and on remand the District Court again 
granted summary judgment for Travelers because it found 
that KRI had validly waived UM coverage for its insureds. 
See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. DiBartolo, No. 96-6238, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1998) (DiBartolo 
II). 
 
II. Corporate Waiver 
 
In 1990, Pennsylvania enacted the Motor Vehicle 
Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL") to control rapidly 
increasing insurance costs. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Cummings, 652 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). At that 
time, UM coverage became completely waivable in 
Pennsylvania, and KRI signed UM coverage rejection forms 
that year. 
 
Under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1731(a) (1997), the amount of 
UM coverage is automatically equal to the bodily injury 
limits of a policy unless the insured effectively exercises the 
option to lower or waive such coverage. The law specifies 
the appropriate waiver language: 
 
       By signing this waiver I am rejecting uninsured 
       motorist coverage under this policy, for myself and all 
       relatives residing in my household. Uninsured coverage 
       protects me and relatives living in my household for 
       losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the 
       negligence of a driver who does not have any insurance 
       to pay for losses and damages. I knowingly and 
       voluntarily reject this coverage. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Our prediction was recently confirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court in Gardner v. Erie Insurance Co., 109 W.D. Appeal Dkt. 1997, 
1999 Pa. LEXIS 154 (Pa. Jan. 26, 1999). 
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75 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1731(b).3 
 
Such was the language of the waiver KRI executed, but 
DiBartolo, noting that KRI is a corporation, argues that the 
plain text of the waiver language ("I," "myself," "[my] 
relatives residing in my household") indicates that the 
legislature must have envisioned the waiver to apply only to 
personal auto insurance policies. Because the legislature 
never explained how a corporation could waive UM 
coverage, he argues that a corporation cannot waive, or 
that at least all covered employees must join in the waiver 
for it to be effective as to them. DiBartolo also invokes the 
principle that the MVFRL is to be construed liberally in 
close cases to afford injured plaintiffs the greatest possible 
coverage. See Danko v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 630 A.2d 1219, 
1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), aff'd, 649 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1994). 
He notes that state public policy disfavors waiver unless the 
law is strictly followed. That principle, however, goes to how 
easy it is to waive and not to who may waive. 
 
The District Court found that the "linguistic style of the 
rejection form, designed for easy comprehension," does not 
evidence a legislative intent to prohibit corporations or 
other legal entities from executing a waiver.4 DiBartolo II, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10060, at *6. We agree. Section 
1731(b) specifically provides that "[t]he named insured shall 
be informed that he may reject uninsured motorist coverage 
by signing the following written rejection form," which 
suggests that any named insured may do so. Furthermore, 
under the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In addition, S 1731(c.1) provides that "Any rejection form that does 
not 
specifically comply with this section is void." 
 
4. DiBartolo points out that Travelers never attempted to get the 
insurance commissioner's approval for a corporate waiver form. However, 
the law makes no provision for a corporate waiver form. Instead, it 
provides the specific language that must be used in a waiver form in 
S 1731(b); if Travelers had tried other language, it would have been out 
of compliance with the law. See Lucas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 680 
A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (even minor deviations from the section 
1731 requirements, such as not printing the forms on separate sheets of 
paper, invalidate the waiver). Travelers used the form provided by law, 
and, even if the language sounds somewhat strange, it is evident what 
the waiver means as to KRI. 
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Cons. Stat. S 1902, words of the masculine gender include 
feminine and neuter forms, and thus "he" may stand for a 
corporation. 
 
In addition, while the MVFRL supports broad coverage, it 
also reflects a public policy to control escalating insurance 
costs, which would be thwarted if corporations could not 
reject UM coverage. See Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 640 
A.2d 1234 (Pa. 1994). It is possible for an insured to reject 
UM coverage for members of his or her household, which 
suggests that the choice to reject coverage does not have to 
be individual but may be made by the person withfinancial 
responsibility for the policy. Finally, the MVFRL specifically 
provides that UM coverage is optional, see S 1731(a), but if 
DiBartolo were correct it would not be very optional for 
corporations.5 
 
There are Pennsylvania cases that find it unremarkable 
that a corporate entity can waive UM coverage. The issue in 
this case was not squarely before those courts and thus 
those decisions are not controlling. Nevertheless, they are 
worth discussing, since Pennsylvania's courts have been 
hostile to attempted waivers if they are not perfectly 
executed. Even with this general presumption against 
waiver, Pennsylvania courts have not suggested that 
corporations are incapable of waiver. 
 
In Blakney v. Gay, 657 A.2d 1302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), 
the court denied the claim of a plaintiff seeking to recover 
under a rental company's insurance policy. The plaintiff 
was an unauthorized driver and thus the car was treated as 
if it were uninsured. The court noted that both the rental 
company and the person who rented the car rejected UM 
coverage. The court concluded that UM coverage "may be 
waived by a car rental company." Id. at 1303. DiBartolo 
argues that the renter's rejection was the crucial fact, and 
we agree that this is a relevant distinction. We find the 
court's reasoning telling, however, because it assumed that 
a corporation can waive UM coverage. In Blakney the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. DiBartolo suggests that each employee would have to waive UM 
coverage to effectuate a corporate waiver, but that theoretical 
possibility 
seems unlikely to have practical reality in a large corporation, or one 
with heavy employee turnover. 
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emphasized that the plaintiff was a stranger to the contract 
lacking privity, whereas DiBartolo submits that he is a 
third-party beneficiary of the contract (a contention 
Travelers does not contest). We do not find that distinction 
relevant under these circumstances. 
 
In Caron v. Reliance Insurance Co., 703 A.2d 63 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997), an employee operating a non-company 
vehicle was held not to be entitled to UM coverage from her 
employer because she was not operating a covered vehicle. 
The court found that the employer, not the employee, was 
the "insured," even though the employee was on a list of 
drivers the employer submitted to the insurance company. 
The court also noted that a reference to "you" in an 
insurance policy referred to the employer, a corporation. 
See id. at 68 & n.9. This is evidence that standard 
language, employed for easy understanding, also covers 
corporations.6 
 
Travelers argues that the insurance department's 
regulations support its interpretation. At 31 Pa. Code 
S 68.101 (1997), there is a list of forms and notices that 
must be sent by insurers to their insureds. Section 
68.101(a) gives the initial list, and then (b) provides that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. There are also two relevant federal cases applying Pennsylvania law. In 
DeSilva v. Kemper National Insurance Co., 837 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 
1993), the court found that the insurer was bound to afford UM coverage 
to an injured employee who was insured under the policy, even though 
the employer waived coverage. In that case, however, the insured vehicle 
was the plaintiff 's personal car, registered in his name, and deductions 
were taken from his paycheck to pay for the insurance. Under the 
circumstances, the court found that he had to be provided with the 
opportunity to waive UM coverage, since the insurance was in a real 
sense his. He was not given that opportunity, and so he received full UM 
coverage. Similarly, DiBartolo cites Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Herr 
Signal & Lighting Co., 757 F. Supp. 490 (M.D. Pa. 1991), as a case in 
which the court held that, even if a corporation can waive UM coverage, 
the individual covered must be provided the option to do so. In that case, 
one person (one of the company's owners) was a named insured, not just 
a covered person. Since the court found a knowing and intelligent waiver 
by the individual, it did not need to decide the issue DiBartolo raises. 
Moreover, if we were to apply the principle beyond named insureds to all 
covered persons, it would contradict the statute's clear provision that a 
policyholder has the power to waive for his or her entire household. 
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certain forms, identified in 75 Pa. Cons. Stat.SS 1705(a)(1) 
& (3), 1791.1(b) & (c), and 1792(b)(1), are not applicable to 
commercial insureds. Travelers contends that this 
regulation shows that the section 1731 waiver of UM 
coverage, which is not among the forms excluded by 31 Pa. 
Code S 68.101(b), does apply to commercial insureds. This 
is a reasonable argument based on the interpretive canon 
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. If we were to find 
that the statute clearly contradicted the administrative 
agency's interpretation, we could discount the agency view, 
but we do not find that to be the case here. See Pysh v. 
Security Pac. Housing Serv., 610 A.2d 973 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Pennsylvania 
allows a corporation to waive UM coverage when the 
corporation is the named insured.7 
 
III. Effective Waiver 
 
Even if corporations generally can waive UM coverage, 
DiBartolo argues that KRI did not effectively do so. It is 
KRI's corporate policy to reject UM coverage in any state 
where that is allowed, and to take the lowest possible 
coverage wherever UM coverage is mandatory. The District 
Court found that KRI's waiver was valid because the 1990 
UM rejection form and the 1994-1995 policy used the 
statutorily required language. DiBartolo has several 
objections, some of which we reject in the margin.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We need not address the issue, addressed in DeSilva, of Pennsylvania 
law's application to a situation in which a company provides a personal 
vehicle for an employee, as the facts in this case are quite different. 
 
8. DiBartolo argues that the rejection forms were not signed prior to the 
date of the accident. This argument is meritless. The District Court 
found that KRI's risk management director signed Pennsylvania UM 
coverage rejection forms on January 1, 1994. Although there was 
evidence in the record that KRI had not signed some states' UM rejection 
forms as of late January 1994, KRI is a national company and Travelers 
provides KRI with insurance in numerous states. Travelers introduced a 
checklist into the record that identifies which states' forms KRI's 
representative had not yet signed and returned as of January 1, 1994. 
Forms for Pennsylvania were not outstanding. See App. at 260. The 
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A. New Policies and Renewals 
 
Pennsylvania requires a substantial amount of 
information to be given at the time a new auto insurance 
policy is issued. DiBartolo argues that the 1994 policy was 
a new policy, not a renewal, and thus, because Travelers 
did not supply the requisite amount of information along 
with the policy, it did not comply with the law. Defects in 
providing information for a new policy might invalidate the 
waiver.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
record does not create an issue of material fact, since there is no 
credible 
evidence that the Pennsylvania waiver forms were unsigned before the 
accident. 
 
DiBartolo also contends that the individual who signed the forms for 
KRI had no authority to bind the company. While DiBartolo points to 
Louisiana cases indicating that a corporate resolution is required to 
waive UM coverage, there is no evidence that this is Pennsylvania's law. 
It is not even always true in Louisiana. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Burton, 
538 So. 2d 1001, 1004 n.1 (La. 1989). DiBartolo cites to Lokay v. Lehigh 
Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., 492 A.2d 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), but 
that case does not concern authority to waive UM coverage. Both of KRI's 
risk managers submitted affidavits that they were told that it was their 
job to procure insurance for KRI and to get the lowest possible UM 
coverage. There is no evidence in the record that they lacked authority 
to waive UM coverage for KRI. Even if they lacked actual authority, no 
reasonable fact finder could conclude that they lacked apparent 
authority, which would also suffice to bind KRI. See id. at 409. 
 
DiBartolo further contends that KRI could not waive UM coverage 
without union consent. Uninsured motorist coverage is a fringe benefit, 
according to DiBartolo I, 131 F.3d at 351, and thus a proper subject for 
collective bargaining. Yet that does not mean that KRI could not act 
without union consent in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. 
The union may make UM coverage a mandatory bargaining issue, but 
until it does so KRI does not lack authority to negotiate coverage on its 
own behalf. 
 
9. However, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Murphy, Nos. 98-CV- 
1692 & 98-CV-1884, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17641 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 
1998), the District Court held that there was no private remedy for a 
violation of section 1791's initial notice requirement. This holding is in 
tension with the Superior Court case of National Union Fire Insurance Co. 
v. Irex Corp., 713 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), which found a waiver 
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DiBartolo's evidence that the policy was not a renewal is 
as follows: Extensive negotiations take place between 
Travelers and KRI each year before the policy is issued. 
Each year takes the previous year's policy as the starting 
point, not the original contract as it was signed the first 
year of coverage. Vehicles are dropped and added each 
year, and premiums fluctuate. Moreover, Travelers makes a 
point of having KRI re-execute its waiver forms. KRI solicits 
offers from other potential insurers and has no intention to 
be bound beyond the duration of each year's contract. 
Travelers concedes that at no time after 1990 did it provide 
KRI with the information mandated by section 1791 for new 
policies. 
 
Pennsylvania law only defines a renewal for certain 
noncommercial automobile insurance policies, not 
encompassing the policy at issue here: 
 
       "Renewal" or "to renew" means the issuance and 
       delivery by an insurer of a policy superseding at the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
invalid where initial section 1791 notice was not properly provided. The 
Superior Court did not hold that there was a direct private remedy for 
the violation of section 1791; instead, it held that, without valid 
notice, 
the court could not find that waiver was valid under section 1731, 
because the insured did not have all of the relevant information 
necessary to make an informed decision. The statute explicitly provides 
that an invalid initial section 1731 notice voids policy limits. 
 
Complicating matters further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
recently decided Donnelly v. Bauer, Nos. 0033 to 0039 Appeal Dkt. 1997, 
1998 Pa. LEXIS 2113 (Pa. Sept. 29, 1998). Each of the appellants in that 
case, upon applying for insurance, received a notice that explained the 
difference between limited and full tort options, and each elected the 
limited tort option, receiving a lower premium. The notice did not, as 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1705(a)(1) requires, contain comparisons of the actual 
annual premiums under each option. The court noted that the 
appellants benefited from their bargain and held that there was no 
private remedy, as in Salazar. Irex Corp. was specifically addressed to 
UM coverage, which exists for different reasons than the full/limited tort 
options. But there appears to be a growing gap between the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and lower state courts on the meaning and 
purpose of the MVFRL; the high court seems unwilling to stand on 
formalities, while the lower courts retain a rigid insistence on the same 
in order to further the policy of protecting accident victims. 
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       end of the policy period a policy previously issued and 
       delivered by the same insurer, such renewal policy to 
       provide types and limits of coverage at least equal to 
       those contained in the policy being superseded, or the 
       issuance and delivery of a certificate or notice 
       extending the term of a policy beyond its policy period 
       or term with types and limits of coverage at least equal 
       to those contained in the policy being extended . . . . 
 
40 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1008.1(2) (1998). While this definition 
does not compel a result in this context, it does provide 
support for our conclusion that the 1994 policy was a 
renewal, since it indicates that Pennsylvania recognizes 
that a policy that changes somewhat from year to year can 
still constitute a renewal. 
 
We do not think that this evidence creates a material 
issue of fact as to whether the 1994 contract was a 
renewal. KRI consistently sought the lowest possible 
coverage, no matter which particular vehicles were covered. 
Travelers persuasively argues that the scale of the contract 
makes a difference, such that changes in specific vehicles 
covered do not convert a renewal into a new policy; a 
commercial insured with a large fleet will inevitably 
experience vehicle turnover. Furthermore, the record is 
replete with references by KRI and Travelers to a"renewal," 
evidencing the parties' understanding that they were 
continuing an ongoing relationship with minor alterations. 
The parties did not need a contractually enforceable 
obligation to renew on identical terms in order to make 
each year's policy a "renewal" instead of a new policy, 
which is what DiBartolo's argument amounts to. See 
Mouton v. Guillory, 494 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (La. Ct. App. 
1986) (rejecting a similar argument that significant changes 
converted a renewal into a new policy). 
 
In conclusion, we find that DiBartolo has not 
demonstrated a material issue of fact on the issue of 
whether KRI's policy was a new policy or a renewal. As we 
are satisfied that KRI's policy was, legally, a renewal, 
Travelers was not required to give the full notice mandated 
for new policies in Pennsylvania. 
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B. The Section 1791 Notice 
 
DiBartolo argues that Travelers did not properly give the 
"Important Notice" required by section 1791. That section 
requires, at the time of application for original coverage, 
that the insurer provide an "Important Notice" of benefits 
and limits available that also reminds the insureds to 
contact their insurance agents with any questions. The 
notice must advise insureds that their signature on the 
notice or their payment of renewal premiums is evidence of 
their knowledge and understanding of the benefits and 
limits available as well as those actually selected. If the 
insurer strictly follows section 1791, there is a conclusive 
presumption that the waiver of UM coverage is valid. See 
Insurance Co. v. Miller, 627 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993). Unlike section 1731, however, section 1791 does not 
contain a provision voiding the benefits and limits chosen 
if the insurer does not strictly comply with that section. 
Furthermore, the District Court found, and DiBartolo does 
not contest, that the "Important Notice" given in 1984, the 
time of the initial contract, was valid.10  
 
In Salazar v. Allstate Insurance Co., 702 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 
1997), the insured signed a valid section 1791.1 notice in 
the original application, but the insurer failed to comply 
with section 1791.1's renewal notice provisions. (Section 
1791.1 is similar to section 1791; it provides for disclosure 
of premium charges and tort options.) The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that there was no private remedy for 
the insurer's admitted noncompliance with the renewal law. 
The Salazar court cited cases holding that, even though a 
violation of the initial UM rejection form requirement in 
section 1731(c.1) will void the waiver of UM coverage, that 
section does not provide a remedy for violation of its 
renewal notice requirement. See Maksymiuk v. Maryland 
Cas. Ins. Co., 946 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The 
structure of the provisions is as follows: When someone 
applies for insurance, the insurer must provide certain 
information; failure to provide the information as required 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. KRI also paid renewal premiums, which evidences its knowledge and 
understanding of available benefits according to the explicit provisions 
of 
section 1791. 
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voids a waiver of UM coverage; on renewal, information 
must also be provided. From that structure, the 
Pennsylvania court concluded that only initial 
noncompliance voids a section 1791.1 waiver, and that only 
the state administrative agency could enforce the renewal 
provisions. The District Court concluded that the same was 
true of section 1791, so DiBartolo could not benefit from an 
invalid renewal notice. 
 
DiBartolo correctly notes that Salazar would be 
distinguishable if we found that there was a new policy in 
1994 or that the original notice was flawed; in that case, no 
valid section 1791 notice would ever have been signed, and 
we would have to determine the import of such a defect. 
However, our decision that the District Court properly 
found that the 1994 policy was a renewal means that we do 
not have to address DiBartolo's arguments on this point. 
DiBartolo does not challenge the claim that the initial 1984 
notice was sufficient, nor does he suggest that the 1990 
notice, given when KRI dropped UM coverage entirely, was 
inadequate. Under Pennsylvania law, he has no private 
remedy if the renewal notices were inadequate. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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